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THE WORLD BANK NEAR THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Abstract
This paper attempts to assess the World Bank's record of
·performance as.principal lender, generator.of ideas and purveyor.
of advice.

It also· examines its internal structure,. its method

z•

of operation and its relations with the other actors on the.
development stage.

Given the recently increased flows of private

capital to the middle income countries, on the one hand, and the
increased need for IDA money, on the other, we see a need for a
·redefinition of the Bank's central role.

Moreover, we find the

dominance of country and global lending targets, along with the
absence of meaningful decentralization and capillary action
between the conceptual and operating wings of the institution to
be the main obstacles to better performance.
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Bretton Woods
we then turn to offering some suggestions for the future.

These

include a more open and participatory approach with respect to
non-Bank ideas, non-Bank lenders and the borrowing countries.

We

also suggest that the internal personnel promotion culture of the
Bank constitutes an important dimension of the problem to be
overcome.
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Gustav Ranis
Yale University
The fiftieth anniversary of any institution, including.those
· ·created ·at Bretton Woods, should serve as an occasion not-so1nuch
to celebrate past accomplishments as to assess the need for
changes required in the light of altered circumstances.
Unfortunately, the World Bank's own just-released effort whose
title promises just that 2 , misses the opportunity and is largely
a justification of what has been done, i.e., basically a public
relations document.

While it states (p. 17) that "the Bank Group

has made its share of mistakes," one searches in vain for either
an enumeration or elucidation of these mistakes nor is there any
discussion of just how the Bank intends to behave differently in
the future.
The Bank is clearly sensitive to its image and has recently
changed the head of its External Relations Division, presumably
because it felt the need for repair on that front.

It responded

to the recent Wapenhans Report by promising to pay more attention
to project implementation relative to project commitment.

But

bigger game than public relations and cutting the embarrassing
lag between commitments and disbursements is at stake.

The Bank,

1This paper draws on the earlier piece by the author,
prepared for the Bretton Woods Commission and appearing as one of
its background papers, "Defining the Mission of the World Bank
Group" in Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future, July, 1994.
Comments by Frances Stewart are gratefully acknowledged.
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The World Bank Group, "Learning from the Past, Embracing ·
.the Future," Washington, D.C., July, 1994.

like most institutions, seems to have difficulty taking a hard
look at itself in the mirror.
Fortunately, we also have the recent report of the Bretton
Woods Commission, chaired by Paul Volcker3 , which has a more
·explicit and 'pronouncedly "'forward-looking cast ,and ·indeed ·
advances a number of proposals for the reform of the Bretton
Woods institutions.

However, the recommendations which emerge

relevant to the World Bank seem rather tame and broad, i.e., in
the main, to encourage domestic private sector activity while
avoiding duplication with private foreign capital flows and to
improve internal efficiency in a number of ways. 4
This paper presents, in Section I, my own interpretation of
what I consider to be the critical aspects of the Bank's past
modus operandi, both external and internal.

In Section II I put

forward some modest suggestions for desirable reforms as we
approach the turn of the century.

I.

An Assessment of World Bank Performance.
The Bank's role as a non-private lender, as a research and

idea-generating unit, and as a provider of advice to the Third
World, can only be called dominant.

Although there are many

complaints that its net capital outflow is currently quite
limited, the World Bank family's gross lending to the Third
3

Bretton Woods:

Looking to the Future, op. cit ..

to be fair, the accompanying Commission Staff Review goes
into a more detailed discussion of some sensitive areas, but
these are not necessarily reflected in the Commission's report.
Indeed the relationship between the two is, perhaps purposefully,
left ambiguous.
4
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World, at nearly $20 billion a year, continues to make it the
major non-private contributor, and certainly the major
multilateral lender.

It attracts a substantial and growing

volume of joint financing from official donors, predominantly the
'Japanese, as well as'a ,small volume of' joint financing f,rom
commercial banks.

Its private sector arm, the International

Finance Corporation (IFC), is focused heavily on providing, and
encouraging others to provide, equity capital to the more
advanced NICs or near-NICs of the Third World, but, while growing
fast, is still not a major player.

IDA, at the other end of the

spectrum, while its net lending is rising, is finding its gross
lending volume squeezed by the ever increasing difficulty of
pushing large replenishments through DC governments.

Partly for

this reason, partly because both China's and India's economic
performance has been improving of late, IDA's attention is being
concentrated increasingly on Sub-Saharan Africa and a few other
poor countries.

Yet, as bilateral concessional aid programs have

come under the same budgetary pressures, the World Bank family's
relative role as a gross concessional lender has been
substantially enhanced, even as the total real value of these
flows in net transfer terms has been declining and as gross
commercial flows have taken on vastly increased importance.

(See

Table I)
The Bank family's major influence on the lending side may
indeed reside in its role as a rating agency for others, both by
virtue of its data collection and country analysis efforts and,,
more importantly, by way of its example as a lender.
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In this .-~-

Table I
World Bank Lending
(billions of$)
1970

1980

1990

0.7
0.2
0.9
13.1
6.9

4.5
1.6
6.1
104.1
5.9

12.2
3.8
16.0
99.0
16.2

Net flows
IBRD
IDA
Total WB
All flows
WB as %-of total

0.4
0.2
0.6
7.0
8.6

3.5
1.6
5.1
61.1
8.3

2.9
3.6
6.5
27.8
23.4

Net transfers
IBRD
IDA
Total WB
All flows
WB as .9,,0 of total

0.2
0.2
0.4
4.6
8.7

1.7
1.5
3.2
29.5
10.8

-4.0
3.3
-0.7
-26.9

Gross disbursements
IBRD
IDA
Total WB
All flows (private and public)
WB as% of total

Sources:

World Debt Tables, World Bank Annual Reports

sense it has, to a considerable extent, supplanted the IMF's
traditional "house-keeping seal of approval" function.

Not only

are private portfolio and direct investment flows powerfully
influenced by what the "grey books" have to say about country x,
but the bilateral donors and regional development banks look to
the World Bank for their own point of departure.

While other

lenders, public and private, may carp, resent, at times criticize
and occasionally even deviate from Bank positions on country risk
assessment, or project viability, the Bank's views are hardly
ever ignored.
Such increasing dominance by the Bank over the last several
4

decades can be attributed to its financial muscle relative to
other ODA providers, as well as to its growing influence in the
realm of ideas, where it has continually asserted its leadership.
There is no piece of data assembly or subject for analysis in
· development in which the Bank has not 'become ·heavily involved~ •
As development emphases have changed over the years -- some have
called them fads -- the Bank has consistently been deeply
engaged.

No input into new thinking, from the painstaking

collection of panel data on households to the application of the
new growth theory, has been left untouched.

The Bank has shown a

tendency not to innovate but to quickly take over the leadership
on any given theme, e.g. cost/benefit analysis from the OECD,
income distribution from Sussex, basic needs from the ILO, and
the social consequences of adjustment from UNICEF.

More current

examples include the environment, women in development, military
expenditures and governance.

Subjects accepted as topical from

either a functional or political point of view are quickly
incorporated into Bank language, the required standard country
data base, become part of the Bank's research and analysis
agenda, and sometimes even of its stated lending criteria.
Needless to add, such continuous modifications of priority
concerns, whatever their individual merits, not only cause
consternation and cynicism among borrowers but also add to the
Bank's administrative costs and to the spreads charged.

It is,

moreover, realistic to assume that it takes the imprimatur of the
Bank before any new emphasis is generally taken seriously -- for
better or worse.

It is, in sum, a fact of life that the Bank,
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disposing over an extremely capable professional staff, and a
..self-assured, if not arrogant, top management -- especially given
the relative weakness, financially and in human resources terms,
of its potential competitors -- can.be said clearly to occupy-the
·conductor's role within the development support ·orchestra-. In its most purely intellectual arena of activity, i.e.,
that of development research, the Bank has, for example, been in
a very expansionary mode until recently, spending roughly $20
million annually on the subject, mostly in-house.

It has its own

quasi-academic publications, the World Bank Economic Review and
the World Bank Research Observer, as well as its influential
annual World Development Reports, plus its quarterly Finance and
Development (joint with the IMF) -- quite a formidable array.

It

also puts out an impressive, steady stream of working and
discussion papers emanating from its various divisions on
virtually every relevant subject.

Its dissemination efforts,

especially in the third world, are prodigious and overwhelming.
At the same time the Bank has paid relatively little
attention to the output of other national and international
organizations engaged in similar activities, but with less human
and financial resources, including the bilateral aid agencies,
the regional development banks, and the U.N. family.

Indeed even

much relevant output by academia is largely ignored.

While there

is much cross-referencing and footnoting in most of the Bank's
output, one finds relatively little to work done outside the
Bank.

The wider academic community is, of course, brought in as

consultants, as visitors, and as participants in World Bank

6

seminars, etc., but, in general, inadequate attention is paid to
the intellectual world outside, especially within the developing
countries themselves where there has been a remarkable
development of ·capacity over the past few decades.
one consequence of this situation, the concentration of an·.
unusually large number of highly qualified professionals within
one institution, all anxious to show their wares to superiors
within a hierarchy dominated by an accepted set of views, is thus
an excessive and costly insularity.

In a somewhat closed system

there is little dissent, little controversy.

Especially the non

Anglo-Saxon academic and policy-making communities, in which
challenges to the neo-classical free market paradigm, while on
the wane, still persist, are generally dismissed or taken too
lightly.

For example, it recently took considerable pressure by

Japan to get the Bank to reexamine its views on the role of
government in East Asia's famous development success cases.
As a direct consequence of its position of predominance in
gross public lending, as well as in applied research and the
generation and diffusion of new developmental emphases and ideas,
the Bank's function as an adviser to governments on development
policy has also expanded dramatically.

The so-called "Washington

Consensus," the conventional wisdom endorsed by the Bank and the
Fund, is undoubtedly less monolithic and more subtle and
differentiated today than many critics have asserted.

The recent

official shift from a pure market orientation to the acceptance
of "market friendly" government interventions, plus the
acknowledgement that governments may do well by organizing
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contests and rewarding (or punishing) performance is a case in
point.

But the kernel of truth remains: the Bank is inhabited by

a large number of highly talented professionals, largely
economists, who have shown little willingness to dissent or
deviate from what the in-house conventional wisdom is 'Seen to be···
at-any point in time, and analyses of government failure continue
to have a much easier time than analyses of market failure.
All this adds up to a position of apparently self-confident
leadership in lending, as well as in data collection, research,
and policy advice.

An important by-product of the Bank's rather

dismissive attitude towards other institutions is that inadequate
consideration has been given to exploring potential divisions of
labor in various directions, as originally envisioned for the
Bretton Woods institutions.

For example, as a result of the need

for fast disbursing balance of payments support during the debt
and adjustment period of the '80s, the Bank has moved deeply into
IMF territory.

While the Bank used to concentrate on projects,

leaving short-term balance of payments issues and related macro
advice to the IMF, most SAL's and SECAL's of the debt crisis
years were really thinly disguised first cousins of IMF
facilities, i.e. the common objective was to get the money out
quickly.

At the same time, the Fund has increasingly encompassed

some micro-level policy reforms in its list of concerns; indeed
Mr. Camdessus 5 recently included "participatory government" as
one of its concerns, a far cry from Bretton Woods.

Increasingly

the need for fast disbursing loans accompanied by a largely
5

Interview, IMF Survey, July 25, 1994.
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overlapping array of conditionality on macro-economic
stabilization and micro-economic structural adjustment issues has
at times rendered the two institutions rather indistinguishable.
Concerning the Bank's relations with the U.N. family, to
cite another example, the complementarities envisaged early··on
with UN-ECOSOC and the Specialized Agencies have persistent~y
atrophied throughout the post-war period.

In the realm of ideas,

UNICEF's pioneering efforts in preventive health, and UNDP's in
calling attention to human development as a basic objective as
well as a means to development, have not been properly
acknowledged.

In the realm of actions, legitimate criticism is

continuously levelled against the heavily politicized, often
inefficient and conference-ridden processes of the U.N., but,
less legitimately, little effort is expended in suggesting the
paths to a more productive relationship.

Also in the realm of

actions, the World Bank now finances more technical assistance
than the UNDP, although this also was not what was envisioned at
Bretton Woods.

-The regional development banks, though late

comers to the family, have similarly been generally treated as
poor cousins who might be invited as money bags into World Bank
orchestrated joint financing ventures but would otherwise be
expected not to "get in the way."

While the Bank does more non

project lending (up to 27% of the total), is undoubtedly more
professionalized, and more willing. and able ,to perform .country......
analyses and provide advice, its project lending portfolio is
difficult to distinguish from that of the regional banks.
disinclination by the lender. to put much effort, ,.beyond the
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Such

rhetorical, into the evolution of a sensible division of labor
among the international financial institutions at a minimum has,
of course, not been costless.

It has led to a substantial

duplication of effort and functions, permitted borrowers to play
lenders·off against each other, and;-helped undermine public
confidence and support for the overall enterprise of aided
development.
As to country coverage, the same phenomenon of an essential
lack of World Bank self-restraint obtains.

Even in the smaller,

poorer countries of each region the Bank is active, along with
the regional banks.

Once the ex-socialist countries of Eastern

Europe, which had initially refused to join the Bank, were ready
to become active borrowers, the Bank made every effort to expand
its activities in that direction, instead of making room for the
newly created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
which could have (sensibly, I believe) received a broader than
strictly private sector mandate.

In its dealings with other

lenders the Bank.. generally prefers to privately criticize their
admittedly inferior professional capacity and to proceed to
ignore them.

It seems to act on the assumption that, if there is

a vacuum, by subject or by country, it is best equipped to fill
it.

If a new problem arises, for example in the realm of

governance, environment or political economy, the ideal solution
is to hire additional, if more specialized, staff.

The

alternative of staying out of a given area and instead helping to
build up the relevant capacities of others within a negotiated
division of labor is apparently viewed as too thankless and time-
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consuming; at any rate it does not seem to get serious attention.
Turning to relevant elements of the Bank's internal modus
operandi, the most significant characteristic that strikes one is
its highly centralized structure.

Only in a very few borrower

countries does the Bank have full-fledged resident missions, -and,"
even in such cases, the substantive decision-making locus for new
commitments and policy advice is located principally in
Washington.

The Volcker Commission found that the typical World

Bank staff member spends only 7% of her time on recipient country
contacts.

The Bank generally operates through many, relatively

brief, visiting missions, some focused on the macro picture,
others on specific sectors, still others on preparing project
appraisals.

Given their brief in-country presence, each mission

usually gathers information on the run and subsequently prepares
country, sectoral or project reports back in Washington, sending
copies sequentially (with changing colors as they approach their
final stage) for comment to host country officials.

While in

country, missions typically insist on meeting with government
officials at the highest levels, frequently raising overlapping
issues and questions.

Under such circumstances, not only is it

difficult to be sure about the·quality of the data and the
analysis but virtually impossible to guarantee full local
understanding, jointness and agreement in the determination of
resource requirements and conditions precedent.

The Bank itself,

given substantial turnover in the composition of its mission
personnel, is not always in a position to move beyond a
relatively narrow, technical assessment of a·country's macro,and·
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especially its micro situation.

Its advice consequently often

lacks realism and depth with respect to the institutional and
political economy dimension of the task ahead.
While the Bank preaches decentralization in the context of
"governance," it clearly does not practice,it.

Its own

organizational choice has succeeded in avoiding the problem of
"localitis, 11 but at a high cost in terms of a lack of continuity,
the need to resort more than is ideal to missions staffed by
relatively junior professionals and an inherent inability to be
sufficiently sensitive to differing institutional, political and
even economic characteristics within individual borrowing
countries.

This undoubtedly has contributed to the accusation,

admittedly sometimes exaggerated, that World Bank officials
prepare "boiler plate" conditionality lists on which only the
country's name and the permissible deficit/GNP ratio, etc. need
be filled in.
A second critical feature of the Bank's posture, which has
helped make it possible to continue to work in this highly
centralized fashion over the last four decades, is that, as an
institution, the Bank has rather consistently focused on the
quantity rather than the quality of its lending.

This will

undoubtedly be hotly denied, but I believe the die on this matter
was cast early on, essentially during the presidency of Robert
McNamara, when annual global and country lending targets were
established, even though -- unlike the case of parliamentaryfunded bilateral donor agencies
to doso.

there was no external mandate

While there has been a continuous evolution of,whatis
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meant by "quality," given the changing set of topics warranting
priority attention (see above), the quantity of lending has
consistently overcome all else as an indicator of "success,"
either at the individual country desk or aggregate Bank level-.
•This comment ·leads. one to the; following,• closely related.;_;.· •·observation, namely that one must acknowledge the co-existence of
two separate circulatory systems in operation within the Bank.
One, encompassing the President's office, the Bank's research
wings, and, usually, the chief economist in each of the operating
regions, is concerned with generating, or at least propagating,
innovative ideas and analyses, with deciding on the subject and
enhancing the quality of the annual World Development Reports,
and with focusing attention on whatever the key policy topic or
topics may be at the moment, whether income distribution, poverty
reduction, environmental concerns or some combination thereof.
The other encompasses the operating departments, where the
continuous flow of project and program lending approvals is what
matters, where the frequent arrival of "new direction" ideas is
met with a jaundiced eye and the well-worn bureaucratic response
that "we are already doing it," and where it is generally
recognized that the bottom line chances for recognition and
promotion are largely tied to being polite but getting on with
the lending.
The existence of these two circulatory systems, with
relatively little real capillary action between them, means that
the Bank suffers from a severe case of .schizophrenia.

When the.

objectives of quantity and quality come into conflict -- and;
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MacNamara notwithstanding, they usually do -- the need for
maintaining the flow of commitments invariably overcomes the
concern with the quality enhancement of the activity and its
overall impact on the borrower country's performance.

What the

recent Wapenhans Report found in terms of the priority of project
commitments over project supervision and implementation is at
least equally true with respect to the Bank's SALs and SECALs,
which were apparently not the subject of that inquiry.
Consequently not only the quality of the more than 25
percent of Bank lending presumably directly addressed to
structural change but also the not inconsiderable policy-related
impact of the Bank's project lending has been given somewhat
short shrift -- though there have been several internal
assessments of SAL and SECAL performance by both the evaluation
and research departments, which were, incidentally, quite candid
but received little publicity.

It seems fair to conclude that,

as far as the lending operations of the Bank are concerned, while
there is a good deal of posturing about how changing country
assessments, new policy packages, and the incorporation of the
latest intellectual concerns, etc. impact the lending programs,
t~e actual machinery is not deeply affected.

Any intelligent

bureaucracy is able to package its lending in ways which reflect
current front office "priorities."

Certainly all the juices

continue to flow in the direction of making the loans and
"getting on with it."
An important by-product of the observed dominance of formaL.
or. informal lending targets is that the Bank undoubtedly pushes«,
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its loans even when there exist viable alternative public donor
or even private capital possibilities.

Thus, even in the poorest

developing .country context we frequently see donor competition..,,.
for projects rather than for capital, i.e., dollars chasing
· projects' rather than•·'the other· way, around.· •'This phenomenon °·i-s· ·
0

usually explained away by reference to developing country
absorptive capacity and project preparation bottlenecks.

But one

can observe the Bank pushing to take the initiative and competing
with other donors for the privilege to lend even in the realm of
the relatively fast disbursing structural adjustment and program
loans.

At the official level, of course, all lending is

recipient country request-based and then jointly negotiated.
But, in fact, the Bank, like other donors, customarily takes the
initiative, convinces the borrower of what it should ask for and,
simultaneously, of what it must do, in the way of policy change
or other, project-related commitments, to merit the loan.

As a

consequence, at the very time that various multilateral and
bilateral donors are competing with each other to fund projects
and programs, both, but especially the latter, are consistently
loaded down with a long list of conditions, partly to impress
superiors within the Bank, partly to keep up with the IMF -
whose relatively fewer, more stabilization-oriented conditions
are usually repeated--, and partly to ensure that most of the
other elements of the Washington Consensus are duly reflected.
The fact that the desire to lend is thus overwhelmingly
strong, while the list of conditions attached is often too long
and insufficiently differentiated to reflect.specific local
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institutional, political, and even economic realities, is well
recognized by the borrowers.

Indeed it is no exaggeration to say

that both parties, having gone through this particular procedure
many times in the past -- with or without benefit of a
··Consultative Group -- 'already 'know·full well that, while the-··"l'oan
instrument may be loaded with conditionality, ultimately the need
to lend will overcome the need to ensure that those conditions
are indeed met.

What results, at the risk of some exaggeration,

is a rather time-consuming and expensive ritual dance.

Few SAL

tranche releases have ever been canceled -- at most they are
delayed.

Few countries, certainly not large ones, have ever had

prolonged break-downs in their relations with the Bank.
As a consequence, the lending cum conditionality process has
been plagued by mounting cynicism, has become increasingly
fatigued and is today not very productive in terms of delivering
on its lofty development objectives.

If policies are improving,

as they have markedly in many countries in recent years, it is
mainly because the East Asian example has had a powerful impact
and because the debt crisis has concentrated borrowers' minds.
The entire process works well only when local polities have
decided, largely on their own but possibly with the help of
outside technical assistance, to effect certain policy changes
and to approach the international community for financial
support; Chile and Mexico are prominent recent examples.
All this is, of course, hard to demonstrate conclusively.
As in any multi-cook process, it is difficult to pinpoint where
the-initiative actually resides or to.attribute credit or blame;_
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but in its program as well as in its project lending, the Bank
has done relatively little ex post analysis of the process itself
or of its contribution to it.

Nor has it sought the kind of

frank exchange with borrowers, at arm's length from loan
negotiations, ·which ntight·· have yield·ed greater realism,·· more·
passivity, and a more effective collaborative style.

II.

Considerations for Bank Reform Near the Turn of the Century.
Major unanticipated changes in the international landscape

have placed new burdens on the Bratton Woods institutions if they
are to remain effective major players.

Just as the resort to

flexible exchange rates in the early 70's shifted the center of
gravity for international monetary decision-making from the IMF
to the G-7 and seemingly forced the former to concentrate more on
the developing countries, the equally unexpected resumption of
large-scale private capital flows is forcing a reluctant World
Bank to reassess its basic mission.

The fact is that the Bank is

being squeezed, on one side, by private capital flows to the
successful NIC's and near-NIC's, calling for more activity by the
IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and,
on the other, by the increased need for IDA-type funds to deal
with the severe problem of stagnation in the poor countries of
the "fourth world," especially Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Bank

continues to play an important role in many countries but it also
needs to engage in some honest introspection.

Long-term senior

Bank executive Ernest Stern, when recently asked (The Economist,
July 23, 1994) what might follow the 50th .anniversary, .responded.
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"the 51st anniversary".

Such complacency won't do; a new

landscape requires openness to change.
In general, where the Bank family continues to be active,,
still in a majority of the middle income and virtually all the
low inconie' 'countries, 'it ,would be·'well advised to better·'
integrate its thinking and lending functions, to exercise more
self-restraint in its lending and to attempt to be a better "team
player" with respect to other donors, private investors, as well
as the borrower countries themselves.

The Bank surely recognizes

that it is but one player among many, even though a very
important one, but the fact that its own future role as a lender
is likely to be increasingly dwarfed by private flows has certain
implications which are not yet fully reflected in Bank policy.
With the World Bank and IDA, together, accounting for less than
20% of total gross lending, the family's total effectiveness
would likely be enhanced if the Bank were willing to behave more
like a major, if increasingly less dominant, primus inter pares
and exercise more self-restraint in lending, while playing a more
narrowly defined catalytic role in the intellectual and
analytical spheres.
Such a change in posture would have a number of specific
applications.

First, it would mean a greater willingness to

share responsibility with the regional development banks on a
country-by-country basis.

Given the admittedly superior

analytical capacities of the World Bank, it would seem to make
sense for it to focus more on the macro,analysis and program
',lending end of the spectrum,and to work out.arrangements so that.
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the various regional development banks can carve out their own
niches, especially, but not necessarily exclusively, in the
project area.
One illustration of what an imaginative division of labor
could ·accomplish ·res·ides •in the area of "growth· with poverty ·
reduction," currently the avowed central objective of virtually
all public lending agencies.

It is, I believe, generally agreed

that country-specific measurements of poverty -- both in terms of
(largely market-related) disposable income poverty and (largely
government services-related) social income poverty -- remain
inadequate; this is even more true with respect to how the
"bottom line" indicators of welfare, such as life expectancy,
infant mortality and literacy, are distributed across a
population.

There is an urgent need for more country-specific

analysis here.

Behavioral issues, utilizing such data, and

focusing on how the links between the nature of the growth path
and the reduction of poverty are affected by the extent of
decentralization, the character of the fiscal system, and the
strength and direction of technology change need to be addressed
prior to the fashioning of effective action cum lending programs.
Such work requires a detailed understanding of local institutions
and human resource availabilities -- a domain in which the
regional development banks, working with indigenous institutions,
would seem to have a comparative advantage -- with the World Bank
contributing the macro analysis of growth cum poverty reduction,
the assessment of borrowing needs, and the identification of
requisite internal policy changes •. Yet at present everyone:seems
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to be "in the act," drawing poverty lines, commissioning parallel
data collection and analytical efforts, as well as gearing up
their own technical assistance and lending programs.

This goes

well beyond the limits of a healthy competition in the realm of·"'"'"
ideas.
Along the same lines, it should be possible to move towards
a flexible country and/or sectoral division of labor.

It might

make sense, for example, to delegate to the regional banks the
responsibility for some small countries and/or some specific
sectoral activities in which they could accumulate specialized
competence, without necessarily moving to any iron-clad
segmentation of functions.

The occasional chairing of

Consultative Groups by the Inter-American and Asian Development
Banks should be encouraged rather than resisted, and efforts
should be made to restructure and strengthen the African
Development Bank rather than wringing one's hands and essentially
ignoring its existence.
At a minimum, where both the World Bank and a regional bank
are active, the latter should be fully brought "into the loop"
early on, i.e. in terms both of original data collection and
institutional knowledge, as well as analytical efforts and the
fashioning of lending programs.

Jointness in the effort should

be viewed increasingly as a two-way street, not a World Bank sub~
contract.

While borrowers would rightly be concerned about

anything approaching a monolithic stance by the international
lending community, enhanced interplay between the World Bank,
which will undoubtedly continue to be more--centralized, and -the--·-·
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relevant regional bank could be expected to improve efficiency.
The regional banks could typically concentrate on projects in
sectors which require more local orientation and expertise, with
the World Bank playing the role of macro-analyst and program
lender,· especially in 'the" la-rge, 1niddle income ·'countries. ·
Encouraging the regional banks to spread their wings, leaving to
them the main responsibility for overall small country lending as
well as more specialized large country projects, while retaining
in the World Bank major responsibility for most middle income
country macro analysis and lending would seem to make a good deal
of sense.

This is not to suggest any precise, therefore rigid

and confining, blueprint for an improved division of labor on a
country or sectoral basis, only to suggest that a more
cooperative and less dismissive or paternalistic attitude by the
Bank is warranted.

If the Bank's posture were one of

encouragement, of sharing information and assisting the build-up
of human capital elsewhere, instead of reinforcing inferiority
complexes by the sheer weight of its lending and intellectual
capital, it would permit the Bank to concentrate more on what it
is really good at.
In a similar vein the Bank's effectiveness would be enhanced
if it abandoned its even more patronizing attitude towards the
U.N. family and instead agreed that it should concentrate on such
subjects as human rights, democratization, governance, concern
with military expenditures and the spread of nuclear weapons,
sensitive political issues which are more appropriately addressed
by one-country-one-vote institutions, with the World Bank and the
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regional banks focused more narrowly on the economic core of the
.· development process.

Powerful rich countries understandably try

to influence the multilateral lending institutions in.the
direction of their, possibly quite meritorious, bilateral
'political objectives·•--·- ·or at· l:ea:st 'a-re perceived to··do ··s·o·~·,--,.gueh
pressure frequently turns out to be counter-productive as it
gives rise to exaggerated conspiracy theories and tends to
undermine the credibility of the banks as truly multilateral and
development-oriented institutions.
Even with respect to such a "narrower" development canvas,
the World Bank's credibility in the borrowing countries would be
enhanced if it resisted the tendency, perhaps fueled by the
required fresh thematics of each World Development Report, to
support ever-changing fads-du-jour.

Most people who have worked

in the development field for a time realize that there is no
"magic bullet," and that, even though learning takes place and
attention may appropriately wander from time to time, depending
on intellectual progress as well as political necessity,
continuous programmatic shifts from growth, to income
distribution, to poverty, to adjustment, back to poverty, to the
environment, and so on, have resulted in a large measure of
corrosive cynicism.
Now that the worst of the debt crisis is over and some
disillusionment with SAL's has set in, the World Bank should
resist the temptation to return to a safer "projects only"
stance.

Its non-project lending should instead be increased but

shifted from a foreign exchange gap orientation-to one focused on
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the local, as well as foreign, exchange costs of agreed on
structural changes whose real and psychological costs could be
eased by the proposed lending package.

While it is never wise to

be doctrinaire about the precise composition of any individual
country program, program lending,· in some form, ·should·be
retained as a flexible tool which is still very much needed to
facilitate major structural reform in many borrower countries.
Policy-based non-project lending, accompanied by properly
negotiated and fully "owned" self-conditionality6 , remains the
best device to help interested borrowers achieve graduation into
NIC status and beyond.

Such a shift would, incidentally, also

free the IMF to attempt to reclaim its original arena of function
and expertise -- though the Fund should retain sqme of its new
and expanded old facilities plus the enhanced flexibility which
permit it to make longer term commitments.
As suggested above, some of the smaller country assessment
and lending activities could be carried out more effectively by
the regional.development banks, while the World Bank would be
well advised to decentralize further and establish resident
missions in at least the larger middle income countries.
Decentralization is needed, especially for work in such areas as
poverty reduction, the environment, human development and
governance, all of which requires an understanding of particular
features of the domestic landscape, for example with respect to
6

Gerry Helleiner has made this point forcefully on several
occasions (see, for.example, his "Growth-Oriented Adjustment
Lending: A Critical Appraisal of IMF/World Bank Approaches"
·• paper for South Commission, -Department.·. of. ·Economics, University-,,,~
of Toronto, 1988).
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financial markets, the character of the informal sector, of local
governments, regulatory norms and the extent to which workably
competitive forces are at work in the formal industrial sector.
If, as appears likely, growth with poverty reduction requires not
only enhancing the employment''•intens'ity' ~of output,but also····
improving the allocation of social income flows provided largely
by government, more attention will need to be paid to governance,
public sector decentralization and market failure.

All these

considerations are very sensitive to local institutional
differences and strongly suggest the need for a more
decentralized structure as well as a more diversified staff on
the part of the Bank.

In order to be effective in the provision

of relevant technical assistance, an important ingredient in Sub
Saharan Africa, for instance, it is almost obligatory to develop
more of a local presence.
One of the critical, yet sometimes neglected, roles of the
World Bank family must be to facilitate a fuller integration of
middle income borrowing countries into the international economy
so that early graduation becomes more likely.

This requires

larger efforts to mobilize foreign private capital flows than can
be handled by the IFC.

Given its own charter limitations on

lending directly to the private sector, the Bank needs to
increase its joint financing activities substantially, as well as
to explore new opportunities for institution building in the
financial sector which can be of substantial help to domestic
medium and small scale enterprises.
The fact that the average Bank loan remains at the $100
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million level provides additional evidence as to the persistence
of a trade-off between the quantity and quality of lending and as
to how the conflict is currently being resolved.

At the same

time more energy should be expended on IDA replenishments and IDA
customers than appears currently to be the case.·

As the Bank · is ,

increasingly squeezed by private foreign capital flows and
increased IFC as well as MIGA activity in the middle income
countries, the IDA and blend countries should get more attention
as well as resources.

This makes especially good sense if the G-

7 can be persuaded to let the IMF pay more attention to its basic
role as guardian of the international monetary system and less to
providing financial aid to the poor countries.
Finally, concerning the inevitably enhanced role of
international trade, as globalization marches on, the Bank has to
date paid relatively little attention to the aggregative impact
of its country-specific advice, frequently suggesting export
promotion as part of its standard prescription, along with the
related liberalization of imports, but usually quite irrespective
of the status of the country's own negotiations reducing trade
barriers on a reciprocal basis within the GATT.

Individual

country advice on exports must clearly also face up to the global
so-called "adding-up problem" in particular commodity markets.
It is increasingly necessary for country programs to be
sensitized to such global issues, possibly with the help of
closer working relations with GATT and the hopefully soon to-be
created World Trade Organization.
The Bank must, of course, recognize that, . in the absence of-,
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joint conceptualization and full agreement with the country
concerned, at the outset, as to what needs to be done in the way
of reform, and what additional resources are required to do.it,
no amount of conditionality will really work.

Recognition of

· this critical/ 'if ,'obvious, point "implies r', however,· ''·something'•yl,es•s

0

obvious, namely the abandonment of, at least implicit, annual
country and regional or global lending targets.

While it is

institutionally and politically unrealistic to be able to move
away completely from some sort of routine minimum annual country
lending activity, major "humps" in levels should be reserved for
packages negotiated at their own pace and with the initiative
clearly shifted to the borrower.
This would require a non-trivial change in the underlying
modus operandi of the Bank.

It would be necessary for the

institution to become more bank-like, i.e. to assume a posture
enabling it to sit back, while encouraging would-be borrowers to
approach it at their initiative with plans for long term reform
packages.

The Bank could, of course, provide technical

assistance, if requested, to help prepare such packages, although
more extensive use of local, as opposed to international
consultants, is also indicated.

Major country assessments could

be carried out with the help of self-destructing, quasi
independent teams, while drawing upon the substantial expertise
and experience that has accumulated both within the Bank and in
the borrowing country, with individuals serving in their own,
rather than their official capacities.

such teams might report

to the traditional Consultative ·Groups-or to.the Development
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Committee, preferably in a way which accentuates the uniqueness
of the new device.

But the important ingredient is the

abandonment of "business-as-usual" lending under which,
regardless of the annual ritual dance -- with or without
Consultative 'Group music---, all ,:parties :recogniz·e ·the\' essent ial,.·ly
0

non-substantive, routinized nature of the relationship.

The sine

qua non would have to be the fullest possible agreement and
commitment by the borrowing country to an agreed policy cum
resources package over at least a five-year period.

With

packages fashioned in the course of negotiations and adorned with
key elements of credible "self-conditionality," the Bank would
then be in a position to be more objective in deciding whether or
not to continue the flow of resources or to cancel a tranche
release, or more, in the case of non-compliance.

Such a

procedure would not only acknowledge the growing professional
competence of LDC policy makers as well as the need for the
program to be fully accepted and "owned" by the borrower, but it
would also provide some much needed freshness and credibility to
a process which has become increasingly fatigued and
unproductive.

The fashioning of realistic programs of reforms to

be supported over a period long enough for the borrower's
economic and political risks to be matched by the external
resource commitments would not, of course, be easy; nor would it
typically occur more than once in a decade in most cases.

But

what is required is genuine structural change packages along with
the additional financial resources needed to hold .off vested
interest groups, ease the pain· of adj.ustment,-as well as provide,
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the required psychological assurance.
Such a posture would not, of course, displace on-going
project lending in a given country but constitute an occasional
major additional "ballooning" of assistance.

It would also be

consistent with leaving shorter term fiscal and monetary
stabilization and balance of payment disequilibrium issues to the
IMF, with the World Bank restricting itself to a, usually

relatively small, number of key structural policy change measures
to be carried out over a sufficiently long period of time so that
institutional and political realities can be taken fully into
account.
The bottom line is that any serious effort at enhancing the
quality of the lending process must entail not only a Bank more
willing to decentralize and work more closely in partnership with
the borrower country, but also one that is willing to enhance the
credibility of the process by occasionally refusing to lend and
by more than occasionally curtailing its lending in mid-stream.
The suggested infrequent ballooning of resource flows would take
place in only a handful of countries at any given time, while
"business as usual," as previously defined, continues elsewhere.
It can also be assumed that the anticipated success of such
an approach would itself lead to a greater willingness by the
industrial countries to support the Bank's role, in concert with
others, to bring more developing countries up to NIC status.

The

application of additional catalytic pressure to get, usually
reluctant, borrowers to accept graduation from NIC to developed.
-country status at the .successful conclusion of. one or two such.,..;;':
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major lending cum action packages should also be part of the
overall negotiating process.

This would permit the Bank to turn

its attention sequentially to other middle-income countries and,
at the same time, demonstrate to the international community the
chances for success, one or two countries at a time, in 'the - - ~{;.'.,;;,
development effort.
In conclusion, if the Bank is to address the most pressing
development problems successfully, it needs to be prepared to
assist both the desperately poor countries, e.g. in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the desperately poor citizens in many of the middle
income countries, e.g. in parts of Latin America.

While the

former will require highly concessional IDA-type flows for some
time to come, the latter will require the Bank's expertise, more
than its financial resources, in ensuring that growth will be
egalitarian as well as sufficiently rapid.

And, most

importantly, as we have been at pains to point out, it will be
increasingly necessary to shift the focus of initiative, in fact
as well as on paper, and to be sensitive to economic,
institutional as well as political differences among borrowing
countries.
But the willingness to participate in the formulation of
such more subtle and differentiated country analysis and action
programs also requires a change in the internal culture of the
Bank.

If Bank staff are to become more willing to cease lending

as well as ensure the superior quality of the lending that does
go forward, the rewards, in terms of internal recognition,
promotion, etc., must point the way.
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This clearly has not been_._

I:

the case in the past, which is one of the main reasons why, all
protestations to the contrary, quantity has crowded out quality,
as the two internal circulatory systems of the Bank, identified
earlier, have meshed only intermittently and imperfectly.
To the outside observer it appears that there are currently~·"'
two main roads open for rapid World Bank internal promotion:
outstanding performance within its research/policy formulation
wing, e.g. in the course of heading up one of the annual WDR's,
to be rewarded by promotion into one of the senior economist
positions in a regional or operating department; or, and more
common, outstanding performance in the quantity of lending and in
keeping on good terms with senior borrowing country officials.
In the wake of the projects-focused Wapenhans Report the Bank
recently promised to reward success in implementation relative to
the making of new lending commitments.

More important

and

also more difficult -- would be providing signals that an effort
will be made to reward staff who help fashion programs today
which have a favorable growth cum equity result some years down
the road.
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